Federal Office
for Information Security

Certification Report

EUCC-3087-2026-04-0004
Administration ID
BSI-DSZ-CC-1025-V7-2026

for

Infineon Technologies AG Smartcard IC IFX_CCI_000011h IFX_CCI_00001Bh IFX_CCI_00001Eh IFX_CCI_000025h G12

from

Infineon Technologies AG



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A. Certification

1. Preliminary Remarks

The Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/482 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 January 2024 [EUCC-VO] establishes a Union-wide cybersecurity certification scheme for TOEs and Protection Profiles for conformity assessments using the requirements of Common Criteria.

By implementing the Cybersecurity Act[1], certification activities at assurance level 'high' and in duly justified cases at assurance level 'substantial' are reserved to the National Cybersecurity Certification Agency of a Member State.

In accordance to BSIG[2] Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) issues certificates for information technology products.

Certification of a product is carried out at the request of a developer, vendor or a distributor, hereinafter called the applicant.

A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according to the security criteria referenced in the above mentioned Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/482 as well as relevant application notes and interpretations published by the certification body of the BSI.

Evaluation facilities notified by the German National Cybersecurity Certification Authority carry out the evaluation.

This Certification Report is the result of the certification activities carried out by the certification body of the BSI in conclusion of the technical evaluation. This report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed Certification Results.

The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and instructions for the user.

2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure

The certification body carries out its activities according to the criteria laid down in the following:

- Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/482 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 January 2024 laying down rules for the application of Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the adoption of the European Common Criteria-based cybersecurity certification scheme (EUCC) [EUCC-VO]
- EUCC state-of-the-art documents of relevance to the TOE [EUCC_SOTA]
- Act on the Federal Office for Information Security[2]

[1] Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on ENISA (the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity) and on information and communications technology cybersecurity certification and repealing Regulation (EU) No 526/2013 (Cybersecurity Act)

[2] Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 2 December 2025, BGBl. 2025 Nr. 301, S. 2

- BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance[3]
- BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs[4]
- Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community)
- ISO/IEC 15408 as published on the day of issuance of this certificate and as mirrored by the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version CC:2022 [CC]
- ISO/IEC 18045 as published on the day of issuance of this certificate and as mirrored by the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version CEM:2022 [CEM]
- DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
- EUCC programme: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (EUCC) [EUCC_PROG]
- BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [AIS]

3. Recognition Agreements

In order to avoid multiple certifications of the same product in different countries a mutual recognition of IT security certificates – as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or CC – under certain conditions was agreed.

3.1. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)

The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08 September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP) (exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).

The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.

The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.

This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including CC part 5 EAL 2 and ALC_FLR components.

4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification

- The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform application and interpretation of the criteria as well as uniform ratings.

[3] Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung – BSIZertV) of 02 December 2025, Bundesgesetzblatt 2025, no. 301

[4] BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs - Besondere Gebührenverordnung des BMI für individuell zurechenbare öffentliche Leistungen in dessen Zuständigkeitsbereich (BMIBGebV), Abschnitt 7 (BSI-Gesetz) - dated 2 September 2019, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1365

- The TOE Infineon Technologies AG Smartcard IC IFX_CCI_000011h IFX_CCI_00001Bh IFX_CCI_00001Eh IFX_CCI_000025h G12 has been certificied by the certification body of the Federal Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) based on administration ID BSI-DSZ-CC-1025-V6-2024. Specific results from the evaluation process were re-used.
- The evaluation of the product Infineon Technologies AG Smartcard IC IFX_CCI_000011h IFX_CCI_00001Bh IFX_CCI_00001Eh IFX_CCI_000025h G12 was carried out by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 25 March 2026. TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH located at

  Unternehmensgruppe TÜV NORD
  Am TÜV 1
  45307 Essen

  is a notified evaluation facility (ITSEF).
- The evaluation was completed on 25 March 2026. TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH is a notified evaluation facility (ITSEF).
- Sponsor and Applicant is: Infineon Technologies AG.
- The assessed TOE was developed by: Infineon Technologies AG.
- The certification activities are concluded with the comparability check and the production of this Certification Report. This work was completed by the certification body of the BSI.

This Certification Report applies only to the version of the TOE as identified in this document. The confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that

- all statements and indications regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the following report, are followed,
- the product is operated in an environment as specified in the following report and in the Security Target.

For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.

The issued Certificate confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target [ST] on certificate’s issuance day. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be reassessed. Therefore, the holder of the certificate should involve the assurance continuity program of the EUCC Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or re-certification) in its obligations to monitor the certified product. Specifically, if certification results should be used in subsequent evaluation and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a reassessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.

In order to prevent an indefinite certificate usage where evolving attack methods justify a recent reassessment of the product’s resistance, the maximum validity period of the certificate is limited. The certificate issued on 27 April 2026 is valid until 26 April 2031 and its validity can be renewed by certifying the TOE again.

The holder of this certificate is obliged:

1. to meet the obligations from the Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/482, in particular but not exclusively to respect the rules for certificate usage, to monitor the conformity of the certified TOE, to inform the certification body about subsequently detected vulnerabilities or irregularities with relevance to the security of the TOE and to maintain vulnerability management and disclosure procedures,

Should changes be introduced into the certified version of the TOE, the validity period of its related certificate can be extended in order to cover the changed TOE, provided the holder of the certificate applies for measures under EUCC scheme's assurance continuity (i.e. recertification or maintenance) and the changed TOE then meets the assurance requirements.

5. Publication

The TOE Infineon Technologies AG Smartcard IC IFX_CCI_000011h IFX_CCI_00001Bh IFX_CCI_00001Eh IFX_CCI_000025h G12 has been notified to ENISA for publication on the website on European cybersecurity certification schemes and has also been included in BSI's list of certified products, which is published regularly (see [EUCC_CERT]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.

This holder of the certificate[5] has to publish on its website this Certification Report and supplementary information. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet address stated above.

[5] Infineon Technologies AG
Melli-Beese-Str. 9
86159 Augsburg

B. Certification Results

The following chapters summarise the assessment results of the

- the applicant’s Security Target specified for the Target of Evaluation,
- the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
- complementary notes, statements and indications from the certification body.

1. Executive Summary

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Infineon Technologies AG security controller (integrated circuit IC), IFX_CCI_000011h, IFX_CCI_00001Bh, IFX_CCI_00001Eh, IFX_CCI_000025h Design Step G12, with specific IC dedicated firmware and the following optional software:

- Asymmetric Crypto Library (ACL):

  RSA2048 / RSA4096 v3.05.002 or v3.03.003 or v3.04.001,

  EC v3.05.002 or v3.03.003 or v3.04.001,

  Toolbox v3.05.002 or v3.03.003 or v3.04.001,

  Base library v3.05.002 or v3.03.003 or v3.04.001,
- Symmetric Crypto Library (SCL) v2.13.001,
- Hardware Support Library (HSL) v2.01.6198,
- NRG™ Library (NRG / NRGS) v04.03.3431, and
- CIPURSE™ Cryptographic Library (CCL) v2.00.0005.

The TOE provides a proprietary 32-bit RISC CPU designed on the basis of the ARMv7_M architecture. The major components of the core system are the CPU (Central Processing Unit), the MPU (Memory Protection Unit) and MED (Memory Encryption / Decryption Unit).

The TOE consists of the hardware part, the firmware part, the software part as well as the user guidance.

This TOE is intended to be used in smart cards for particularly security relevant applications and for its previous use as developing platform for smart card operating systems. The term smartcard embedded software is used in the following for all operating systems and applica-tions stored and executed on the TOE. The TOE is the platform for the smartcard embedded software.

The product Infineon Technologies AG Smartcard IC IFX_CCI_000011h IFX_CCI_00001Bh IFX_CCI_00001Eh IFX_CCI_000025h G12 has been certified under the EUCC scheme in accordance to the provisions of the Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/482. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-1025-V6-2024. Specific results from the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-1025-V6-2024 were re-used. The TOE deliverables are listed in table 1.

The evaluation of the product Infineon Technologies AG Smartcard IC IFX_CCI_000011h IFX_CCI_00001Bh IFX_CCI_00001Eh IFX_CCI_000025h G12 was conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 25 March 2026. TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH is a notified evaluation facility (ITSEF).

The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [ETR] was provided by the ITSEF according to the Common Criteria [CC], the Methodology [CEM], the requirements of the Scheme [EUCC-VO],[EUCC_PROG].

The evaluation has confirmed:

- CC Version and Release: see [CC] and [CEM]
- PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages Version 1.0, 13 January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 [PP]

- Assurance Level: EUCC High with component AVA_VAN.5
- Assurance Package: EAL 5
- Augmentation: Global Assurance: ADV_IMP.2, ADV_INT.3, ADV_TDS.5, ALC_CMC.5, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_FLR.3, ALC_TAT.3, ATE_FUN.2, ATE_COV.3, AVA_VAN.5 sub-TSF assurance level EAL6 augmented with ALC_FLR.3

The Security Target [ST] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified Protection Profile Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages Version 1.0, 13 January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 [PP].

A detailed description of the security functionality, addressed threats, organisational security policies and the operational environment can be found in the Security Target [ST].

Depending on the blocking configuration, the product can have e.g. different user available memory sizes and can come with or without individual accessible cryptographic coprocessors. All products are identical in regard to module design, layout, and footprint. All possible configuration options are described in Section 2.

This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.

The vulnerability assessment results stated in this certificate do not express an appraisal of the strength and suitability of the cryptographic algorithms implemented in the TOE (see BSIG Section 52, Para. 4, Clause 2).

The certification results apply only to the version of the product indicated in the certificate and on the condition that all the statements and indications are kept as detailed in this Certification Report. Neither the BSI nor any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate implicitly or explicitely guarantee or endorse the certified TOE.

2. Identification of the TOE

The Information and communications technology product is identified as follows:

Infineon Technologies AG Smartcard IC IFX_CCI_000011h IFX_CCI_00001Bh IFX_CCI_00001Eh IFX_CCI_000025h G12

Holder of the certificate: Infineon Technologies AG
Melli-Beese-Str. 9
86159 Augsburg
https://www.infineon.com/product-information/cybersecurity-information

The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:

No	Type	Identifier	Release	Form of Delivery
1	HW	IFX_CCI_000011h, IFX_CCI_00001Bh, IFX_CCI_00001Eh, IFX_CCI_000025h	G12	Customer chooses delivery method
2	SW	BOS	80.201.04.1 or 80.201.04.2	Stored on the delivered hardware
3	SW	NRG™ base - Not part of the TSF	80.201.04.1 or 80.201.04.2	Stored on the delivered hardware
4	SW	Flash Loader - Optional; depending on order	80.201.04.1 or 80.201.04.2	Stored on the delivered hardware
5	SW	**Optional Software**	**Optional Software**	**Optional Software**

No	Type	Identifier	Release	Form of Delivery
6	SW	RSA2048 Library - Optional; depending on order	v3.05.002 or v3.03.003 or v3.04.001	Secure download (L251 Library File; object code) via ishare
7	SW	RSA4096 Library - Optional; depending on order	v3.05.002 or v3.03.003 or v3.04.001	Secure download (L251 Library File; object code) via ishare
8	SW	EC Library - Optional; depending on order	v3.05.002 or v3.03.003 or v3.04.001	Secure download (L251 Library File; object code) via ishare.
9	SW	Toolbox Library - Optional; depending on order and not part of the TSF	v3.05.002 or v3.03.003 or v3.04.001	Secure download (L251 Library File; object code) via ishare
10	SW	Base Library - Optional; depending on presence of RSA, EC, and Toolbox	v3.05.002 or v3.03.003 or v3.04.001	Secure download (L251 Library File; object code) via ishare
11	SW	Symmetric Crypto Library (SCL) - Optional; depending on order	v2.13.001	Secure download (L251 Library File; object code) via ishare
12	SW	CIPURSE™ library (CCL) - Optional; depending on order	v2.00.0005	Secure download (L251 Library File; object code) via ishare
13	SW	Hardware Support Library (HSL) - Optional; depending on order	v2.01.6198	Secure download (L251 Library File; object code) via ishare
14	DOC	32-bit Security controller – V07 Hardware Reference Manual [AGD_HRM]	v6.0 / 2019-06-13	Secured download (personalized PDF) via ishare
15	DOC	ARMv7-M Architecture Reference Manual [AGD_ARM]	2010-02-12	Secured download (personalized PDF) via ishare
16	DOC	Production and personalization 32-bit ARM-based security controller User´s Manual [AGD_PPUM]	v3.5 / 2021-12-17	Secured download (personalized PDF) via ishare
17	DOC	32-bit Security Controllers SLC37 (65 nm Technology) Programmer´s Reference Manual [AGD_PRM]	v5.3 / 2022-07-08	Secured download (personalized PDF) via ishare
18	DOC	32-bit Security Controller – V07 Security Guidelines [AGD_Sec]	V1.01-3117 / 2025-09-02	Secured download (personalized PDF) via ishare
19	DOC	32-bit Security Controller – V07 Errata Sheet [AGD_ES]	v7.2 / 2022-01-24	Secured download (personalized PDF) via ishare
20	DOC	ACL37-Crypto2304T-C65 Asymmetric Crypto Library for Crypto2304T RSA/ECC/Toolbox 32-bit Security Controller User interface manual - Optional; delivered if RSA, EC, or Toolbox library is ordered in version v3.05.002 [AGD_ACL_1]	v3.05.002 / 2025-11-26	Secured download (personalized PDF) via ishare

No	Type	Identifier	Release	Form of Delivery
21	DOC	ACL37-Crypto2304T-C65 Asymmetric Crypto Library for Crypto2304T RSA/ECC/Toolbox 32-bit Security Controller User interface manual - Optional; delivered if RSA, EC, or Toolbox library is ordered in version v3.03.003 [AGD_ACL_2]	v3.03.003 / 2025-11-26	Secured download (personalized PDF) via ishare
22	DOC	ACL37-Crypto2304T-C65 Asymmetric Crypto Library for Crypto2304T RSA/ECC/Toolbox 32-bit Security Controller User interface manual - Optional; delivered if RSA, EC, or Toolbox library is ordered in version v3.04.001 [AGD_ACL_3]	v3.04.001 / 2025-11-26	Secured download (personalized PDF) via ishare
23	DOC	SLxx7-C65 Hardware Support Library - Optional; delivered if HSL is ordered [AGD_HSL]	v1.3 / 2019-07-05	Secured download (personalized CHM) via ishare.
24	DOC	SCL37-SCP-v4-C65 Symmetric Crypto Library for SCP-v4 AES/DES/MAC 32-bit Security Controller User interface manual - Optional; delivered if SCL is ordered [AGD_SCL]	v2.13.001 / 2021-06-16	Secured download (personalized PDF) via ishare
25	DOC	CIPURSE™ Crypto Library CCL37xCIP v2.00.0005 CIPURSE™ V2 User Interface - Optional; delivered if CCL is ordered [AGD_CCL]	v1.4 / 2018-03-13	Secured download (personalized PDF) via ishare
26	DOC	32-bit Security Controller Crypto@2304T V3 User Manual - Optional; delivered if the Cryp-to2304T is available on the TOE [AGD_Crypto]	v3.0 / 2024-06-21	Secured download (personalized PDF) via ishare

Table 1: Deliverables of the TOE

3. Security Policy

The security policy enforced is defined by the selected set of security functional requirements and implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:

The security policy of the TOE is to provide basic security functionalities to be used by the smart card operating system and the smart card application, thus providing an overall smart card system security. Therefore, the TOE will implement a symmetric cryptographic block cipher algorithm (Triple-DES and AES) to ensure the confidentiality of plain text data by encryption and to support secure authentication protocols and it will provide different random number generators.

The RSA library – irrespective of the version – is used to provide a high-level interface to RSA (Rivest, Shamir, Adleman) cryptography implemented on the hardware component Crypto2304T and includes countermeasures against SPA, DPA and DFA attacks. The EC library – irrespective of the version – is used to provide a high-level interface to Elliptic

Curve cryptography implemented on the hardware component Crypto2304T and includes counter-measures against SPA, DPA and DFA attacks.

Furthermore, the TOE also contains the optional CIPURSE™ Cryptographic Library (CCL), which can be used to implement a CIPURSE™ V2 conformant protocol in the IC embedded software.

Besides that, the TOE can come with the optional Hardware Support Library (HSL), which provides a simplified interface for NVM management and provides the possibility to write tearing safe into the NVM.

As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE is also to provide protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the confidentiality of cryptographic keys during AES, Triple-DES, RSA and EC cryptographic functions performed by the TOE), against physical probing, against malfunctions, against physical manipulations and against abuse of functionality. Hence, the TOE shall

- maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of the TOE and
- maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of security functionalities (security mechanisms and associated functions) provided by the TOE.

Specific details concerning the above-mentioned security policies can be found in Chapters 7 and 8 of the Security Target [ST].

4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope

The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These uncovered aspects need to be provided for by specific security objectives that have to be met by the TOE environment. They are in particular:

The ST includes the following security objective for the IC embedded software developer: OE.Resp-Appl.

The objective OE.Resp-Appl states that the IC embedded software developer shall treat user data (especially keys) of the composite product appropriately. The IC embedded software developer gets sufficient information on how to protect user data adequately in the security guidelines [AGD_Sec].

The ST includes the following security objectives for the operational environment, which are relevant for the Composite Product Manufacturer: OE.Process-Sec-IC, OE.Lim_Block_Loader, OE.Loader_Usage, OE.TOE_Auth and OE.Secure_Delivery.

The objective OE.Process-Sec-IC requires the protection of the TOE, as well as of its manufacturing and test data up to the delivery to the end-consumer. As defined in [ST, 2.2.5] the TOE can be delivered to the composite product manufacturer after phase 3 or after phase 4 (as complete modules, plain wafers, bare dies, in any IC case, or in any type of package). However, the single chips are identical in all cases. This means that the test mode is deactivated and the TOE is locked in the user mode. Therefore, it is not necessary to distinguish between these forms of delivery. Since Infineon has no information about the security requirements of the implemented IC embedded software it is not possible to define any concrete security requirements for the environment of the composite product manufacturer.

The objective OE.TOE_Auth requires that the environment has to support the authentication and verification mechanism and has to know the corresponding authentication reference data. The composite product manufacturer receives sufficient information with regard to the authentication mechanism in [AGD_PPUM, 4].

The objective OE.Loader_Usage requires that the authorised user has to support the trusted communication with the TOE by protecting the confidentiality and integrity of the loaded data and he has to meet the access conditions defined by the flash loader. [AGD_PPUM, 4] provides sufficient information regarding this topic.

The objective OE.Lim_Block_Loader requires the composite product manufacturer to protect the loader against misuse, to limit the capability of the loader and to terminate the loader irreversibly after the intended usage. The permanent deactivation of the flash loader is described in [AGD_PPUM, 4]. This objective for the environment originates from the “Package 1: Loader dedicated for usage in secured environment only”. However, this TOE also implements “Package 2: Loader dedicated for usage by authorized users only” and thus, the flash loader can also be used in an unsecure environment and is able to protect itself against misuse if the authentication and download keys are handled appropriately.

The objective OE.Secure_Delivery complements the second item of the previous OE in case the TOE is ordered with a (temporarily) deactivated Flash Loader but already flashed customer software. In this case, the customer is required to implement mechanisms to prevent attacks during TOE transport as required by the security needs of the loaded IC Embedded Software. This requirement is provided to the user as part of [PPUM, 3] describing the relevant scenario:

> *Scenario 2: The customer orders Flash Loader chips and asks Infineon to fill the NVM with the appropriate application code and data. […] On delivery, the customer application is active and responsible for transport protection.*

As Infineon has no information about the security requirements of the implemented IC embedded software, it is not possible for the guidance to define any concrete security requirements for the environment of the IC Embedded Software Developer or Composite Product Manufacturer.

Details can be found in the Security Target [ST].

5. Architectural Information

Detailed information in the TOE architecture is to be found in the [ST] section 2.1.

6. Supplementary Cybersecurity Information

The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 1 is being provided with the product to the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.

The developers website as stated in chapter 2 provides the following supplementary information:

- the period during which support is offered (esp. security related updates)
- contact information of the manufacturer or provider and accepted methods for receiving vulnerability information from end users and security researchers
- a reference to online repositories listing publicly disclosed vulnerabilities related to the TOE/ICT, ICT service or ICT process and to any relevant cybersecurity advisories

Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of this report have to be followed.

7. IT Product Testing

All tests have been carried out by ITSEF: TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH,
Unternehmensgruppe TÜV NORD
Am TÜV 1
45307 Essen
under the responsibility of certification Body

Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 87
Postfach 20 03 63
D-53175 Bonn

Please refer to chapter 1 for details on assurance levels or packages involved into testing.

The following State-of-the-art-documents were applied:

Refer to chapter 9.1.

Developer’s testing approach:

All TSFs and related security mechanisms, subsystems and modules are tested in order to assure complete coverage of all SFRs.

Different classes of tests are performed to test the TOE in a sufficient manner:

- Simulation tests (design verification)
- Qualification test
- Verification test
- Security Evaluation tests
- Production tests

The evaluator’s testing effort can be summarised in the way described in the following:

The evaluator's objective regarding this aspect was to test the functionality of the TOE and to verify the developer's test results by repeating developer's tests contained, respectively referenced and to add independent tests.

In the course of the evaluation of the TOE the following classes of tests were carried out:

- Module tests,
- Simulation tests,
- Emulation tests,
- Tests in user mode,
- Tests in test mode,
- Hardware tests,
- Optional library tests.

With these kinds of tests the entire security functionality of the TOE was (functionally) tested by the ITSEF.

The penetration testing was partially performed using the developer's testing environment, partially using the test environment of the evaluation body.

All configurations of the TOE being intended to be covered by the current evaluation were tested.

The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the actual test results; moreover, no attack scenario with the attack potential high was actually successful.

Please refer to chapter 11 for complete and precise information on settings and configuration of the TOE during the evaluation, including relevant operational notes and observations.

8. Evaluated Configuration

This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:

Smartcard IC IFX_CCI_000011h, IFX_CCI_00001Bh, IFX_CCI_00001Eh, IFX_CCI_000025h G12 (Tainan).

Hardware configuration:

Depending on the blocking configuration, a product can have different user available configuration by order or by BPU (please refer to the Security Target [ST] section 1.1, for an identification of the components, which can be blocked via BPU).

The Crypto@2304T coprocessor provides functionalities for asymmetric cryptography. If it is not available, the optional software libraries Toolbox, RSA and EC cannot be used, because they depend on the features of this coprocessor.

If the TOE is delivered with a deactivated SCP, it will not provide the hardware based AES and TDES calculations and the SCL cannot be used.

Deselecting a cryptographic coprocessor has no impact on any other security policy of the TOE. It is exactly equivalent to the situation where the user decides just not to use the functionality.

Firmware configuration:

There are two firmware packages available for the TOE, referenced via the firmware identifiers 80.201.04.1 or 80.201.04.2.

The firmware package consists of different parts:

- Boot Software (BOS),
- Flash Loader, and
- NRG™ base (not part of the TSF).

An overview of the firmware parts is given by the developer in the Security Target [ST] section 2.2.2.

Software libraries:

The TOE can be delivered with optional software libraries, as described in Security Target [ST] section 1.1 / 2.2.2.

The optional software libraries listed in Table 2 above can be freely combined according to the demands of the user. If one of the RSA, EC, and Toolbox libraries is selected, a Base Library with the same version number is automatically included, as it is required in order to

use the aforementioned libraries. If none of these libraries is selected, the Base Library is not included. Furthermore, the RSA Library can be selected in two variants supporting different key lengths, as indicated in the table above. However, the version of EC, RSA and Toolbox libraries cannot be chosen independently.

Based on the library selection the TOE can be delivered with or without the functionality of the RSA, EC, SCL, HSL, CCL, NRG™, and Toolbox libraries. This is considered in the developer documentation and corresponding notes are added where required.

If the user decides not to use the RSA, EC, SCL, HSL, CCL, NRG™, and Toolbox libraries it is not delivered to the user and the accompanying additional specific security functionality as listed in Table 10 is not provided by the TOE. Deselecting the libraries excludes the code implementing functionality, which the user decided not to use. Excluding the code of the deselected functionality has no impact on any other security policy of the TOE; it is exactly equivalent to the situation where the user decides just not to use the functionality.

Overall:

In accordance with these configuration possibilities, developer and evaluator tested the TOE in these configurations.

9. Results of the Evaluation

9.1. CC specific results

The ITSEF produced and provided the Evaluation Technical Reports (ETR) [ETR] according to the the requirements of the Scheme [EUCC-VO],[EUCC_PROG], the Common Criteria [CC], the Common Evaluation Methodology [CEM], and all relevant interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [AIS].

For the evaluation from component level AVA_VAN.4 onwards the following state-of-the-art documents and supporting documents were applied:

The following guidance specific for the technology was used:

- Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 1, Durchführung der Ortsbesichtigung in der Entwicklungsumgebung des Herstellers, Version 14, 2017-10-11,
- Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 14, Anforderungenan Aufbau und Inhalt der ETR-Teile (Evaluation Technical Report) für Evaluationen nachCC (Common Criteria), Version 7, 2010-08-03,
- Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 19, Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der Zusammenfassung des ETR (Evaluation Technical Report) für Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria), Version 9, 2014-11-03,
- Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 20, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministischeZufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 4, 2025-04-11, Herausgeber: Zertifizierungsstelle des BSI im Rahmen des Zertifizierungsschemas,
- Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 23, Zusammentragen von Nachweisen der Entwickler, Version 4, 2017-03-15,

- Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 26, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen, Version 10, 2017-07-03,
- Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 2.5, 2022-05, Joint Interpretation Working Group (confidential),
- Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 31, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 4, 2025-04-11
- Developer evidence for the evaluation of a physical true random number generator, Version 0.8, 2013-02-28, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
- Evaluation Report as part of the Evaluation Technical Report, Part B – ETR-Part True Physical and Hybrid Random Number Generator, Template-Version 0.7, 2013-02-28, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
- Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) – AIS 34, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+ (CC v2.3 & v3.1) and EAL6 (CC v3.1), Version 3, 2009-09-03,
- Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 35, Öffentliche Fassung eines Security Target (ST-lite), Version 2, 2007-11-12
- Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 36, Kompositionsevaluierung, Version 5, 2017-03-15,
- Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 37, Terminologie und Vorbereitung von Smartcard-Evaluierungen, Version 3, 2010-05-17,
- Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) – AIS 38, Reuse of evaluation results, Version 2, 2007-09-28,
- Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) – AIS 39, Formal Methods, Version 3, 2008-10-24, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
- Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) – AIS 41, Guidelines for Pps and STs, Version 2, 2011-01-31,
- Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 46, Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen und ergänzende Hinweise für die Evaluierung von Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, 2013-12-04,
- Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 47, Regelungen zu Site Certification, Version 1.1, 2013-12-04

are considered.

Additionally the CC Supporting Mandatory Technical Documents

- Joint Interpretation Library – Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 3.2.1, 2024-02 and
- Joint Interpretation Library – ETR template for composite evaluation of Smart Cards and similar devices, Version 1.1, August 2015
- Transition Policy to CC:2022 and CEM:2022, 2023-04-20, Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement Management Committee, CCMC-2023-04-001.

- EUCC Scheme State-of-The-Art Document - Security Architecture requirements (ADV_ARC) for smart cards and similar devices extended to Secure Sub Systems in SoCs, Version 1.1, 2023-10, ENISA.
- EUCC Scheme State-of-The-Art Document - Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 1.2, 2023-08, ENISA.
- EUCC Scheme State-of-The-Art Document - Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 2.0 (DRAFT), 2025-02, ENISA.
- EUCC Scheme State-of-The-Art Document - Composite product evaluation and certification for CC: 2022, Version 1.0 (DRAFT), 2025-02, ENISA.
- EUCC Scheme Guideline on Cryptography, Version 2, 2025-05, ENISA.
- COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2024/482 of 31 January 2024 laying down rules for the application of Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the adoption of the European Common Criteria-based cybersecurity certification scheme (EUCC), 2024-01-31, ENISA.
- EUCC Scheme State-of-The-Art Document - The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits, Version 1.1, 2023-10, ENISA.
- EUCC Scheme State-of-The-Art Document - The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits, Version 2.0 (DRAFT), 2024-12, ENISA.
- EUCC Scheme State-of-The-Art Document - Minimum ITSEF requirements for security evaluations of Smart Cards and similar devices, Version 1.1, 2023-10, ENISA.
- EUCC Scheme State-of-The-Art Document - Minimum Site Security Requirements, Version 1.1, 2023-10, ENISA.
- EUCC Scheme State-of-The-Art Document - Minimum Site Security Requirements, Version 2.0 (DRAFT), 2025-02, ENISA.
- EU Commission Implementing Regulation 2024/482, 2024-01-31, EU
- EUCC Scheme State-of-The-Art Document - STAR methodology, Version 1.0 (DRAFT), 2025-02, ENISA.
- Remaining Strength of Asymmetric Cryptographic Mechanisms after Partial Key Leakage, Version 1.0 (confidential), 2020-06, Joint Interpretation Working Group.
- Joint Interpretation Library – Assurance Continuity - Practical Cases for Smart Cards and similar devices, Version 1.1, 2024-04, Joint Interpretation Working Group.
- ETR for composite evaluation TD SC & SD, Version 1.2, 2024-04, Joint Interpretation Working Group.
- ADV_SPM.1 interpretation for [CC:2022] transition, Joint Interpretation Library, Version 1.0, 2024-05

are considered.

For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20/31 was used (see [AIS]).

To support composite evaluations according to the State of the Art document the document ETR for composite evaluation [ETRRfCOMP] was provided and approved. This document provides details of this platform evaluation that have to be considered in the course of a composite evaluation on top.

The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of the evaluation of the TOE.

As a result of the evaluation, the verdict PASS is confirmed for the assurance components that are identified in chapter 1 of this report and claimed by the Security Target [ST] for the corresponding TOE. The corresponding TOE is identified in chapter 2 of this report.

The certificate

- is uniquely identified by: EUCC-3087-2026-04-0004, administration ID BSI-DSZ-CC-1025-V7-2026
- was issued on: 27 April 2026
- is valid until: xx Month 20xx (Datum der Ausstellung plus 5 Jahre - 1Tag)

The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 1 and the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.

9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment

The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification procedure (see BSIG Section 52, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with a security level of lower than 120 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102' (https://www.bsi.bund.de).

The following table gives an overview of the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to enforce the security policy and outlines its rating from cryptographic point of view. Any Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column '*Security Level above 120 Bits*' of the following table with '*no*' achieves a security level of lower than 120 Bits (in general context) only.

No.	Purpose	Cryptographic Mechanism	Standard of Implementation	Key Size in Bits	Security Level above 120 Bits
1	Key Agreement	ECDH (ACL v3.05.002, v3.03.003 and v3.04.001)	[X963], [IEEE_P1363], [ISO_11770-3]	Key sizes corresponding to the used elliptic curves NIST: P-{192, 224, 256, 384, 521}, K-{163, 233, 283, 409}, B-{233, 283, 409} [FIPS186-4]; brainpool: P{160, 192, 224, 256, 320, 384, 512}t1, P{160, 192, 224, 256, 320, 384, 512}r1 [RFC5639]	Key sizes 160, 163, 192: No Key sizes >= 250: Yes
2	Cryptographic Primitive	TDES in modes ECB,CBC, CTR, CFB,	[N867] [N838]	|k| = 168	No

No.	Purpose	Cryptographic Mechanism	Standard of Implementation	Key Size in Bits	Security Level above 120 Bits
		(SCP, SCL v2.13.001) CBC-MAC, CBC-MAC-ELB (SCP) PCBC (SCL v2.13.001) CMAC (SCL v2.13.001) RMAC (SCL v2.13.001)	[ISO_9797-1] [Schneier] [N838] [ISO_9797-1]	|k| = 112 (for legacy use only, see [N867]),	
3	Cryptographic Primitive	AES in modes ECB, CTR,CBC, CFB, (SCL v2.13.001) CBC-MAC, CBC-MAC-ELB, (SCP) PCBC CMAC (SCL v2.13.001)	[FIPS197] [N838] [ISO_9797-1] [Schneier] [N838]	|k| = 128, 192, 256	ECB: No CTR, CBC, CFB: Yes No Encryption: Yes Authenticated Encryption: No 128: No
4	Cryptographic Primitive	RSA encryption / decryption / signature generation / verification (only modular exponentiation part) (ACL v3.05.002 and v3.03.003 and v3.04.001)	[PKCS-1], [IEEE_P1363]	Modulus length = 1976^{8} – 4224 RSA encryption is only in the scope of the evaluation up to 2112 bits.	Yes, >= 2800

No.	Purpose	Cryptographic Mechanism	Standard of Implementation	Key Size in Bits	Security Level above 120 Bits
5	Cryptographic Primitive	ECDSA signature generation (ACL v3.05.002 and v3.03.003 and v3.04.001)	[X962], [IEEE_P1363], [ISO_14888-3	Key sizes corresponding to the used elliptic curves NIST: P-{192, 224, 256, 384, 521}, K-{163, 233, 283, 409}, B-{233, 283, 409} [FIPS186-4]; brainpool: P{160, 192, 224, 256, 320, 384, 512}t1, P{160, 192, 224, 256, 320, 384, 512}r1 [RFC5639]	Key size 160,163,192: No Key sizes >=250: Yes
6	Cryptographic Primitive	ECDSA signature verification (ACL v3.05.002 and v3.03.003 and v3.04.001)	[X962], [IEEE_P1363], [ISO_14888-3]	Key sizes corresponding to the used elliptic curves NIST: P-{192, 224, 256, 384, 521}, K-{163, 233, 283, 409}, B-{233, 283, 409} [FIPS186-4]; brainpool: P{160, 192, 224, 256, 320, 384, 512}t1, P{160, 192, 224, 256, 320, 384, 512}r1 [RFC563]	Key size 160,163,192: No Key sizes >=250: Yes
7	Random Number Generation	Physical True RNG PTG.2	[AIS31]	N/A	N/A
8	Random Number Generation	Hybrid Random Number Generator PTG.3	[AIS31]	N/A	N/A
9	Random Number Generation	Deterministic Random Number Generation DRG.3	[AIS31]	N/A	N/A
10	Random Number Generation	Key Stream Generation DRG.2	[AIS31], [ADV_TDS_Achterbahn]	N/A	N/A

No.	Purpose	Cryptographic Mechanism	Standard of Implementation	Key Size in Bits	Security Level above 120 Bits
11	Session key agreement	AES	[CIPURSE_Crypto, 5.3 "Session Key Derivation and Authentication Algorithm"]	|k| = 128	Yes
12	Authentication	AES	[CIPURSE_Crypto, 5.3 "Session Key Derivation and Authentication Algorithm"] and [CIPURSE_Crypto, 6.3 "Integrity Protection"]	|k| = 128	Yes
13	Secure Messaging for Integrity	MAC based on AES	[CIPURSE_Crypto, 6.3 "Integrity Protection"]	|k| = 128	No
14	Secure Messaging for Confidentiality	AES	[CIPURSE_Crypto, 6.3 "Confidential Communication"]	|k| = 128	Yes
15	Key generation	RSA key Generation using CryptoGeneratePrime (ACL v3.05.002)	Proprietary The generated Keys meet [PKCS1, 3.1 / 3.2] [IEEE_P1363, 8.1.3.1]	1024 - 4224	Yes, >= 2800
16	Key generation	RSA key Generation using CryptoRsaKeyGenMask_PQ (ACL v3.05.002 v3.03.003 and v3.04.001)	The generated keys meet [PKCS #1, 3.1 / 3.2] and [IEEE_P1363, 8.1.3.1]	1024 - 4224	Yes, >= 2800
17	Key generation	EC using ECC_ECDSAKeyGenMask (ACL v3.05.002 and v3.03.003 and v3.04.001)	[X962, A 4.3] [ISO_14888-3, 6.4.2] [IEEE_P1363, A.16.9]	|k| = 160, 163, 192, 224, 233, 256, 283, 320, 384, 409, 512, 521 bits	Key sizes < 250: no Key sizes >= 250 : yes

Table 2: TOE cryptographic functionality

Furthermore, regarding the additional notes “Note to DRG.2.2” and “Note to DRG.2.3” in [ST] (section 7.1.1.5) for FCS_RNG.1/KSG, no statement is given in this Certification Report.

The Flash Loader's cryptographic strength was also not assessed by BSI. However, the evaluation according to the TOE's Evaluation Assurance Level did not reveal any implementation weaknesses.

Please note, that this holds true also for those algorithms, where no cryptographic 120-Bit-Level assessment was given. Consequently, the targeted Evaluation Assurance Level has been achieved for those functionalities as well.

Reference of Legislatives and Standards quoted above:

[N867] NIST SP800-67 Revision 1, Recommendation for Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher, 2012-01, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)

[N838] NIST SP800-38A, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation, Methods and Techniques, 2001, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)

[ISO_9797-1] Information technology - Security techniques - Message Authentication Codes (MACs) - Part 1: Mechanisms using a block cipher, 2011-03, ISO/IEC

[Schneier] Applied Cryptography, Second Edition, B. Schneier, John Wiley & Sons, 1996

[FIPS197] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD (AES), November 2001, U.S. department of Commerce / National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)

[PKCS1] PKCS #1 v2.2: RSA Cryptography Standard, 2012-10, RSA Laboratories

[IEEE_P1363] IEEE P1363. Standard specifications for public key cryptography. IEEE, 2000

[X962] American National Standard for Financial Services, ANS X9.62–2005, Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry, The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), 2005-11, American National Standard Institute

[ISO_14888-3] Information technology - Security techniques – Digital signatures with appendix - Part 3: Discrete logarithm based mechanisms, 2006-11, ISO/IEC

[AIS31] Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 31, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, 2013-05-15

[X963] American National Standard for Financial Services, ANS X9.63–2011, Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry, Key Agreement and Key Transport Using Elliptic Curve Cryptography, 2011-12, American National Standard Institute

[ISO_11770-3] Information technology - Security techniques - Key management - Part 3: Mechanisms using asymmetric techniques, 2008-07, ISO/IEC

[FIPS186-4] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication FIPS PUB 186-4, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), July 2013, U.S. department of Commerce / National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)

[RFC5639] RFC 5639, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Brainpool Standard Curves and Curve Generation, 2010-03

[Achterbahn] ACHTERBAHN-128/80, 2006-06-30, Infineon Technologies AG

[CIPURSE_Crypto] The CIPURSE™V2 Specification Cryptographic Protocol, Revision 1.0, 2012-09-28, Infineon Technologies AG

10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE

Table 1: Deliverables of the TOE outlines the documents that contain necessary information on the intended use of the TOE including all security related information, conditions and instructions to be taken into account by the user. In addition all aspects of

Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target and not covered by the TOE itself need to be met by the operational environment of the TOE.

The customer or user of the TOE shall take the statements of this certificate into account in its system risk management process. The user should define measures in its risk management that respond to emerging and new attack methods and techniques to the TOE until the TOE has been reassessed.

The user also has to consider in its risk management the limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9.

Some security measures are partly implemented in this certified TOE, but require additional configuration or control or measures to be implemented by a product layer on top, e.g. the IC Dedicated Support Software using the TOE. For this reason the TOE includes guidance documentation (see table 2) which contains obligations and guidelines for the developer of the product layer on top on how to securely use this certified TOE and which measures have to be implemented in order to fulfil the security requirements of the Security Target of the TOE. In the course of the evaluation of the composite product or system it must be examined if the required measures have been correctly and effectively implemented by the product layer on top. Additionally, the evaluation of the composite product or system must also consider the evaluation results as outlined in the document "ETR for composite evaluation" [ETRfCOMP].

At the point in time when evaluation and certification results are reused there might be an update of the document "ETR for composite evaluation" available. Therefore, the certified products list on the BSI website has to be checked for latest information on reassessments, recertifications or maintenance result available for the product.

The TOE is delivered to the composite product manufacturer and to the security IC embedded software developer. The actual end-consumer obtains the TOE from the composite product issuer together with the application that runs on the TOE.

The security IC embedded software developer receives all necessary recommendations and hints to develop his software in form of the delivered documentation.

- All security hints described in the delivered documents [AGD_ACL], [AGD_ARM], [AGD_CCL], [AGD_Crypto], [AGD_ES], [AGD_HRM], [AGD_HSL], [AGD_PPUM], [AGD_PRM], [AGD_SCL], and [AGD_Sec] have to be considered.

The composite product manufacturer receives all necessary recommendations and hints to develop his software in form of the delivered documentation.

- All security hints described in [AGD_PPUM] have to be considered.

In addition, the following hint resulting from the evaluation of the ALC evaluation aspect has to be considered:

- The security IC embedded software developer can deliver his software either to Infineon to let them implement it in the TOE (in the Flash memory) or to the composite product manufacturer to let him download the software in the Flash memory.

The delivery procedure from the security IC embedded software developer to the composite product manufacturer is not part of this evaluation and a secure delivery can be required.

In addition, the following aspects need to be fulfilled when using the TOE:

- OE.Secure_Delivery - Secure Delivery of the TOE in case of deactivated flash loader

When the TOE is ordered with a disabled Flash Loader, it does not provide full transport protection. Therefore, technical and / or organisational security procedures (e.g. a custom mutual authentication mechanism or a security transport) should be put in place by the customer to secure the personalized TOE during delivery as required by the security needs of the loaded IC Embedded Software.

As Infineon has no information about the security requirements of the implemented IC embedded software, it is not possible for the guidance to define any concrete security requirements for the environment of the IC Embedded Software Developer or Composite Product Manufacturer.

11. Security Target

For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [ST] of the Information and communications technology (TOE) product is provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. [if sanitised]It is a sanitised version of the complete Security Target used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was performed according to the rules as outlined in the provisions of the EUCC certification scheme policy (see Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/482, Annex V, V.2).

For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [ST] of the TOE / Information and communications technology (ICT) product is provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.

12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)

None

12.1. Acronyms

BSI	Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG	BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA	Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC	Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM	Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP	Collaborative Protection Profile
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR	Evaluation Technical Report
ICT	Information and communications technology
IT	Information Technology
ITSEF	Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PP	Protection Profile
SAR	Security Assurance Requirement
SFP	Security Function Policy
SFR	Security Functional Requirement
ST	Security Target

TOE Target of Evaluation

TSF TOE Security Functionality

12.2. Glossary

Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.

Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.

Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.

Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-established mathematical concepts.

Informal - Expressed in natural language.

Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which subjects perform operations.

Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements

Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific consumer needs.

Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific identified TOE.

Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.

Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.

Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.

TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.

13. Bibliography

[EUCC-VO] Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/482 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 January 2024 laying down rules for the application of Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the adoption of the European Common Criteria-based cybersecurity certification scheme (EUCC)
and
Implementation Regulation (EU) 2025/2462 of 8 December 2025 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/482 as regards definitions, ICT product series certification, assurance continuity and state-of-the-art document

[CC] ISO 15408:2022, Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
- Part 1: Introduction and general model
- Part 2: Security functional components
- Part 3: Security assurance components
- Part 4: Framework for the specification of evaluation methods and

	activities - Part 5: Pre-defined packages of security requirements https://www.iso.org/standard/72891.html https://www.iso.org/standard/72892.html https://www.iso.org/standard/72906.html https://www.iso.org/standard/72913.html https://www.iso.org/standard/72917.html as mirrored by CCRA's edition: CC:2022 R1, Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 1: Introduction and general model - Part 2: Security functional components - Part 3: Security assurance components - Part 4: Framework for the specification of evaluation methods and activities - Part 5: Pre-defined packages of security requirements https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[CEM]	ISO 18045:2022: Information technology Security techniques Methodology for IT security evaluation https://www.iso.org/standard/72889.html as mirrored by CCRA's edition: CEM:2022 R1, Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[EUCC_SOTA]	EUCC state-of-the-art documents: https://certification.enisa.europa.eu/publications/eucc-state-art-documents_en
[EUCC_PROG]	EUCC program of the BSI: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (EUCC), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[EUCC_CERT]	EUCC Certificates, periodically updated list published on ENISA's website on European cybersecurity certification schemes (https://certification.enisa.europa.eu/) but also on BSI's website (https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte)
[AIS]	Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE[6] https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[ST]	Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1025-V7-2026, Version 2.9, Date 2026-04-14, Confidential Security Target IFX_CCI_000011h IFX_CCI_00001Bh IFX_CCI_00001Eh IFX_CCI_000025h G12, Infineon Technologies AG (confidential document) Security Target lite, Version 2.9, Date 2026-04-14, Public Security Target IFX_CCI_000011h IFX_CCI_00001Bh IFX_CCI_00001Eh IFX_CCI_000025h G12, Infineon Technologies AG
[PP]	Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages Version 1.0, 13 January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014
[ETR]	Evaluation Technical Report, Version 6, Date 2026-04-21, EVALUATION TECHNICAL REPORT SUMMARY (ETR SUMMARY) Common Criteria CC:2022 (Multi-Assurance with global assurance level EAL5 augmented with ADV_IMP.2, ADV_INT.3, ADV_TDS.5, ALC_CMC.5, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_FLR.3, ALC_TAT.3, ATE_FUN.2, ATE_COV.3, AVA_VAN.5 and sub-TSF assurance level EAL6

[6]See section 9.1 for detailed list of used AIS

augmented with ALC_FLR.3), File Name: 1025-V7_ETR_260319_v4.docx, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)

[ETRfCOMP] Evaluation Technical for Composite Evaluation (ETR COMP) for the IFX_CCI_000011h, IFX_CCI_00001Bh, IFX_CCI_00001Eh, IFX_CCI_000025h G12, Version 6, Date 2026-04-21, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)

[ConfList] Configuration list for the TOE, Version 1.0, Date 2026-02-02, Life Cycle Support Configuration Management for IFX_CCI_000010h with options Including optional Software Libraries Flash Loader – ACL – HSL –SCL – HCL, Infineon Technologies AG (confidential document)

[AGD_Sec] 32-bit Security Controller – V07 Security Guidelines, Version 1.01-3117, 2025-09-02, Infineon Technologies AG

[AGD_PPUM] Production and personalization 32-bit ARM-based security controller, Version 3.5, 2021-12-17, Infineon Technologies AG

[AGD_HRM] 32-bit Security Controller – V07 Hardware Reference Manual, Version 6.0, 2019-06-13, Infineon Technologies AG

[AGD_PRM] SLC37 (65-nm) Security Controller Programmer´s Reference Manual, Version 5.3, 2022-07-08, Infineon Technologies AG

[AGD_Crypto] 32-bit Security Controller Crypto@2304T V3 User Manual, Version 3.0, 2024-06-21, Infineon Technologies AG

[AGD_ES] 32-bit Security Controller – V07 Errata Sheet, Version 7.2, 2022-01-24, Infineon Technologies AG

[AGD_SCL] SCL37-SCP-v4-C65 Symmetric Crypto Library for SCP-v4 AES/DES/MAC 32-bit Security Controller User interface manual (v2.13.001), 2021-06-16, Infineon Technologies AG

[AGD_ACL] ACL37-Crypto2304T-C65 Asymmetric Crypto Library RSA / ECC / Toolbox 32-bit Security Controller User Interface (v3.05.002), 2025-11-26, Infineon Technologies AG
ACL37-Crypto2304T-C65 Asymmetric Crypto Library RSA/ECC/Toolbox 32-bit Security Controller User interface manual (v3.03.003), 2025-11-26, Infineon Technologies AG
ACL37-Crypto2304T-C65 Asymmetric Crypto Library RSA/ECC/Toolbox 32-bit Security Controller User interface manual (v3.04.001), 2025-11-26, Infineon Technologies AG

[AGD_CCL] CIPURSE™ Crypto Library CCL37xCIP v2.00.0005 CIPURSE™ V2 User Interface (v2.00.005), Version 1.4, 2018-03-13, Infineon Technologies AG

[STAR_IFX_SJX] Site Technical Audit Report (STAR), Infineon Technologies Americas Corp., San Jose, CA, USA,Version 1, 2025-11-19, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)

[STAR_IFX_Morgan] Site Technical Audit Report (STAR) Infineon Technologies AG, Morgan Hill, CA, USA, Version 1, 2025-11-19, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)

[STAR_IFX_Bgl] Site Technical Audit Report (STAR) Infineon Technologies India Pvt. Ltd, Bangalore, India, Version 4, 2025-10-29, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)

[STAR_KWE_Sha] Site Technical Audit Report (STAR), KWE Kintetsu World Express (China) Co.,Ltd., Version 2, 2026-03-12, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)

[STAR_IFX_Wuxi] Site Technical Audit Report (STAR), Infineon Technologies Co. Ltd, Wuxi, China, Version 1, 2025-11-18, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)
[STAR_K&N_GrOs] Site Technical Audit Report (STAR) Kuehne & Nagel, Großostheim, Version 1, 2025-12-05, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)
[STAR_ATP_Manila] Site Technical Audit Report (STAR) Amkor Technologies Inc., Philippines, Version 1, 2025-11-19, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)
[AGD_HSL] SLxx7–C65 Hardware Support Library (v2.01.6198), Version 1.3, 2019-07-05,Infineon Technologies AG
[AGD_ARM] ARMv7-M Architecture Reference Manual, 2010-02-12, ARM

C. Annexes

List of annexes of this certification report

Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.

Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development and production environment

Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1025-V7-2026

Evaluation results regarding development and production environment

The IT product Infineon Technologies AG Smartcard IC IFX_CCI_000011h IFX_CCI_00001Bh IFX_CCI_00001Eh IFX_CCI_000025h G12 (Target of Evaluation, TOE, also named as ICT product) has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM) [CEM].

As a result of the TOE certification, dated 27 April 2026, the following results regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance requirements ALC – Life cycle support as claimed by the ST [ST] and that are stated in chapter 1 of this report are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below are the Distribution Centres:

Site ID	Company name and address
DHL Singapore	DHL Supply Chain Singapore Pte Ltd., Advanced Regional Center Tampines LogisPark 1 Greenwich Drive Singapore 533865
K&N Großostheim	Kühne & Nagel Stockstädter Strasse 10 63762 Großostheim Germany
KWE Shanghai	KWE Kintetsu World Express (China) Co., Ltd. Shanghai Pudong Airport Pilot Free Trade Zone No. 530 Zheng Ding Road Shanghai, P.R. China
IFX Morgan Hill	Infineon Technologies North America Corp. 18275 Serene Drive Morgan Hill, CA 95037 USA

The Site Technical Audit Reports (STAR) ([STAR_IFX_SJX], [STAR_IFX_Morgan], [STAR_IFX_Bgl], [STAR_KWE_Sha], [STAR_IFX_Wuxi], [STAR_K&N_GrOs] and [STAR_ATP_Manila]) are part of this certification procedure.

For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance with the Security Target [ST]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security Target [ST]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.

Note: End of report