Federal Office
for Information Security

CC Common Criteria CYBERSECURITY CERTIFICATION
HIGH
SUBSTANTIAL
BASIC
AVA_VAN.5
eucc-3087-2026-03-0002

Assurance Continuity Maintenance Report

EUCC-3087-2026-03-002
Administration ID
BSI-DSZ-CC-1000-V3-2026-MA-02

for
Secure Smart Grid Hub (SGH-S) Version 2.0.2

from
EFR GmbH

The ICT product identified in this report was assessed according to [EUCC-IR] Annex IV.3 (“Changes to a certified ICT product – Maintenance and re-evaluation”). The baseline for this assessment were the Certification Report, the Security Target and the Evaluation Technical Report of the product certified by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) under EUCC-3087-2026-03-002 (with administration ID BSI-DSZ-CC-1000-V3-2026) updated by Maintenance with administration ID BSI-DSZ-CC-1000-V3-2026-MA-01, dated 14 October 2026.

The change to the certified product is at the level of bugfixing in the update process. The identification of the maintained product is indicated by a new version number compared to the certified product.

Considering the nature of the change leads to the conclusion that it is classified as a minor change in accordance with [EUCC-IR] Annex IV.3 (5) / (5a first part) and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.

The resistance to attacks has not been re-assessed (in the sense of [EUCC-IR] Annex IV.2) in the course of this maintenance process. Therefore, the assurance statement as outlined in the Certification Report EUCC-3087-2026-03-002 (with administration ID BSI-DSZ-CC-1000-V3-2026) dated 20 March 2026, updated by Maintenance with administration ID BSI-DSZ-CC-1000-V3-2026-MA-01, dated 14 October 2026, is of relevance and has to be considered when using the product. Details can be found on the following pages.

This report is an addendum to the Certification Report EUCC-3087-2026-03-002 (with administration ID BSI-DSZ-CC-1000-V3-2026).

Common Criteria

Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement recognition for components up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR only

Bonn,9 November 2026

The Federal Office for Information Security

DAkkS Deutsche Akkreditierungsstelle D-ZE-19615-01-00

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Assessment

The IT product identified in this report was assessed according to [EUCC-IR] Annex IV.3 (“Changes to a certified ICT product – Maintenance and re-evaluation”) and the Impact Analysis Report (IAR) [IAR] according to [EUCC-IR] Annex IV.3 (2). The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report of the certified product (Target of Evaluation, TOE) [CertReport], its Security Target and the Evaluation Technical Report as outlined in [ETR].

The vendor for the Secure Smart Grid Hub (SGH-S), Version 2.0.2, EFR GmbH, submitted an IAR [IAR] to the BSI for approval. The IAR is intended to satisfy the requirements according to the procedures on Assurance Continuity [EUCC-IR] Annex IV.3 (5) and (5a first part). In accordance with those requirements, the IAR describes (i) the changes made to the certified TOE, (ii) the evidence updated as a result of the changes and (iii) the security impact of the changes.

The Secure Smart Grid Hub (SGH-S), Version 2.0.2 was changed due to the implementation of a bug fix in the firmware update process. Configuration Management procedures required a change in the product identifier. Therefore the version number changed from TOE Version SGH-S V2.0.1 with Software version 2.1 to TOE Version SGH-S V2.0.2 with Software version 2.2. The Security Target was editorially updated.

Conclusion

The maintained change is at the level of implementation. The change has no effect on product assurance.

Considering the nature of the change leads to the conclusion that it is classified as a minor change in the sense of [EUCC-IR] Annex IV.3 (5) or (5a first part) and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.

The resistance to attacks has not been re-assessed (in the sense of [EUCC-IR] Annex IV.2) in the course of this maintenance process. Therefore, the assurance statement as outlined in the Certification Report EUCC-3087-2026-03-002 (with administration ID BSI-DSZ-CC-1000-V3-2026) dated 20 March 2026, updated by Maintenance with administration ID BSI-DSZ-CC-1000-V3-2026-MA-01, dated 14 October 2026 is of relevance and has to be considered when using the product.

Obligations and notes for the usage of the product:

All aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.

The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk management process. In order to adapt to the evolution of attack methods, the customer or user should specify a period within which a re-assessment from the certificate sponsor is requested.

Additional Note: The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of the product certification and this maintenance procedure (see BSIG[1] Section 52, Para. 4, Clause 2).

For details on results of the evaluation of cryptographic aspects refer to the Certification Report [CertReport] chapter 9.2.

This report is an addendum to the Certification Report [CertReport].

1 Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 2 December 2025, BGBl. 2025 , no. 301, p. 2

References

[EUCC-IR]	Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/482 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 January 2024 laying down rules for the application of Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the adoption of the European Common Criteria-based cybersecurity certification scheme (EUCC) and Implementation Regulation (EU) 2025/2462 of 8 December 2025 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/482 as regards definitions, ICT product series certification, assurance continuity and state-of-the-art document
[IAR]	Impact Analysis Report, Version 1.00_d, 27.10.2026, EFR GmbH (confidential document)
[CertReport]	Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1000-V3-2026 for Secure Smart Grid Hub (SGH-S) Version 2.00, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, (20.03.2026)
[ST_old]	Security Target Smart Grid Hub Secure, Version 2.03, 09.09.26, EFR GmbH
[Config]	Konfigurations-Management Scope Konfigurationsliste, Version 2.03_e, 28.10.2026, EFR GmbH (Confidential document)
[ST]	Security Target Smart Grid Hub Secure, Version 2.04, 28.10.26, EFR GmbH