

EUCC Certification Report

ZTE OTN Solution v1.10

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Foreword

The Common Criteria-based European Cybersecurity Certification Scheme (EUCC) is a certification scheme created under the Cybersecurity Act (CSA), Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of 17 April 2019.

The EUCC is described by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/482 of 31 January 2024, laying down rules for the application of Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the adoption of the European Common Criteria-based cybersecurity certification scheme (EUCC).

The Dutch implementation of the CSA is regulated in Dutch law in the 'Uitvoeringswet cyberbeveiligingsverordening' (UITVW). In this law the role of NCCA is assigned to the Dutch Authority for Digital Infrastructure (RDI), which is part of the Ministry of Economic Affairs.

TrustCB B.V. has been licensed by the RDI as a Certification Body (CB) for the task of ISO/IEC 17065 Certification Activities up to and including CSA assurance level high for ICT security products, as well as for protection profiles. Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile according to the NP002 EUCC processes published by the Dutch NCCA.

Evaluations of ICT products are performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) licensed by the Dutch NCCA as a CAB for ISO/IEC 17025 Evaluation Activities, with scope aligning to the requested Evaluation Assurance Level of the Object for the evaluation, referred to as the Target of Evaluation (TOE) in this report.

By awarding an EUCC certificate as a Common Criteria certificate, TrustCB B.V. asserts that the ICT product complies with the security requirements specified in the associated security target, or that the protection profile (PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common Criteria for Information Security Evaluation. A security target is a requirements specification document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities.

The consumer should review the security target or protection profile, in addition to this certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the ICT product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the evaluation assurance level) that the ICT product satisfies the security requirements stated in the security target.

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International recognition of the certificate

The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of published certificates based on the Common Criteria (CC). Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance components up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR.

For details of the current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, see <http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org>.

1 Executive Summary

This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the ZTE OTN Solution v1.10, identified in this document as either the ICT Product or as the Target of Evaluation (TOE).

The developer of the ICT Product is ZTE Corporation located in Shenzhen, P.R. China and they also act as the sponsor of the evaluation and certification.

This Certification Report is intended to assist prospective consumers when judging the suitability of the ICT security properties of the ICT product for their particular requirements.

The TOE is the ZTE OTN solution aimed to build broadband and intelligent full connection for the ICT field in the 5G era. Based on cloud data centers (DCs), ZTE OTN solution establishes large-capacity interconnection pipes between DCs and between DCs and services, to implement unified transport of fixed/wireless networks and vertical industries.

A certification procedure was conducted on the TOE by TrustCB B.V., in accordance with the provisions of the EUCC as described in Commission implementing regulation (EU) 2024/482 of 31 January 2024, amended by (EU) 2024/3144 of 18 December 2024 and (EU) 2025/2462 of 8 December 2025.

The successful completion of the certification procedure resulted in TrustCB issuing an EUCC certificate. The certificate identifier is **EUCC-3110-2026-2500102-01**, dated 04-07-2026 and with a 5-year validity.

The evaluation of the TOE was performed by SGS Brightsight located in Delft, the Netherlands. The evaluation was completed on 03-03-2026 with the issuance of the evaluation technical report [ETR]. The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CC:2022, R1 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CC:2022 R1 [CC] (Parts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5).

The scope of the evaluation was defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made during the evaluation, the intended environment for the ICT Product, the security requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which the product is intended to satisfy the security requirements.

The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR]¹ for this product provide sufficient evidence that the TOE meets the EAL3 augmented (EAL3+) assurance requirements for the evaluated security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_FLR.2 "Flaw Reporting Procedures".

The AVA_VAN level applied during the evaluation was AVA_VAN.2. This assurance level is recognised by article 52 of [CSA] as 'substantial'.

Consumers of this ICT Product are advised to verify that their own environment is consistent with the security target, and to give due consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this certification report.

TrustCB B.V., as Certification Assessment Body licensed by the Dutch Authority for Digital Infrastructure (RDI) for EUCC high certification activities, declares that the product will be listed on the ENISA EU Cybersecurity Certificates list and that the evaluation meets all the conditions for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates.

Note that the certification results apply only to the specific version of the product as evaluated.

¹ The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the evaluator, and is not available for public review.

2 ICT Product details

2.1 Identification of the ICT Product

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is ICT product ZTE OTN Solution v1.10 from ZTE Corporation located in Shenzhen, P.R. China.

The TOE is comprised of the following main components:

Delivery item type	Hardware models	Software Version
Hardware models	ZXONE 9700 S3K ZXONE 9700 G2K ZXONE 9700 NX41 ZXONE 9700 OX42 ZXONE 9700 NXG0 ZXONE 9700 NXG1	ZXONE19700V1.10.010.002B500, including the following patches: ZXONE19700V1.10.010.002B500CP001 ZXONE19700V1.10.010.002B500CP002 ZXONE19700V1.10.010.002B500CP003
Hardware models	ZXONE 7000 C2	ZXONE7000V2.00R5B111, including the following patches: ZXONE7000V2.00R5B111_C01 ZXONE7000V2.00R5B111_C02
Hardware models	ZXMP M721 CX66A(E) ZXMP M721 CX63A(E) ZXMP M721 DX63(E)	ZXM721V5.10.070.001B100, including the following patches: ZXM721V5.10.070.001B100CP001 ZXM721V5.10.070.001B100CP002

Additional requirements for the operational environment of the certified ICT product are described in section 4.2 of the [ST].

To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided with the TOE. For details, see section 2.6 of this report, "Supplementary Cybersecurity Information.

2.2 Contact information related to the evaluation of the ICT Product

Holder of the EUCC Certificate

Organisation name:	ZTE Corporation
Address:	ZTE Plaza, Keji Road South, Hi-Tech Industrial Park, Nanshan District, Shenzhen, Guangdong, P.R. China
Certified product contact details	GCTC@zte.com.cn

Developer of the certified ICT Product

ICT product developer	ZTE Corporation
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Identification of CAB

The Certification Assessment Body for this ICT Product is TrustCB B.V. TrustCB is licensed by the Dutch Authority for Digital Infrastructure (RDI) for EUCC certification activities up to and including EUCC High.

TrustCB point of contact: EUCC@trustcb.com

Identification of ITSEF

Evaluation and testing for this ICT Product was performed by following ITSEF:

SGS Brightsight in Delft, the Netherlands

2.3 Security services and policies

2.3.1 Security services

The major security features of the TOE are:

- Secure management and usage of the TOE, to ensure that only properly authorized staff can manage and/or use the TOE
- Secure interaction between various parts of the TOE and between the TOE and various machines in the environment, so that the management data and commands cannot be read or modified in-between
- Logging and auditing of user actions
- Information flow control for management traffic.

2.3.2 Vulnerability management

The following vulnerability policy has been identified as applicable to the ZTE OTN Solution v1.10

Document reference: ZTE Vulnerability Management and Disclosure Policy V2.0, 20 October 2025

2.3.3 Assurance Continuity policies

This is a new product certification. An assurance continuity policy was not provided.

2.3.4 Lifecycle management processes and production facilities

Not applicable to this evaluation.

2.3.5 Patch management process

Not applicable to this evaluation.

2.4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope

2.4.1 Assumptions

The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see section 4.2 of the [ST].

The user guidance as outlined in section 2.6 contains necessary information about the usage of the TOE and its configuration in the environment to fulfil all Assumptions described in the [ST].

Certain aspects of the TOE's security functionality, in particular the countermeasures against attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the software and the hardware part of the TOE.

There are no particular obligations or recommendations for the user apart from following the user guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant details concerning the resistance against certain attacks.

2.4.2 Clarification of scope

Considering all Assumptions above, the evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security functions of the product.


Threats addressed by the TOE are presented in Section 4.1 of [ST]. The assumed level of expertise of the attacker for all identified threats is Basic.

No Organizational Security Polices (OSPs) have been defined for this TOE.

2.5 Architectural Information

The TOE is the ZTE OTN solution aimed to build broadband and intelligent full connection for the ICT field in the 5G era. Based on cloud datacentres (DCs), ZTE OTN solution establishes large-capacity

interconnection pipes between DCs and between DCs and services, to implement unified transport of fixed/wireless networks and vertical industries.



The TOE is widely used in metro network (including core layer, aggregation layer, and access layer) and backbone network. They provide transmission solutions with various capacities, transmission distances, and intelligent service applications.

2.6 Supplementary Cybersecurity Information

The following website link was provided for the ZTE OTN Solution v1.10 for the supplementary cybersecurity information referred to in Article 55 of Regulation (EU) 2019/881:

https://www.zte.com.cn/global/about/trust-center/otn_products.html

This link provides further details and links on:

- Guidance and recommendations to assist end users with the secure configuration, installation, deployment, operation and maintenance of the ZTE OTN Solution v1.10.
- The period during which the ZTE OTN Solution v1.10 security support will be offered to end users, in particular as regards the availability of cybersecurity related updates, is stated as 5 years aligned with the validity of the issued EUCC certificate.
- Contact information and accepted method for receiving vulnerability information from end users and security researchers for the ZTE OTN Solution v1.10, (<https://www.zte.com.cn/global/about/trust-center/ztepsirt.html>)
- the online repository listing publicly disclosed vulnerabilities related to the ZTE OTN Solution v1.10 and to any relevant cybersecurity advisories (https://support.zte.com.cn/zte-iccp-isupport-webui/support/bulletin/security?code=bulletin%E2%8C%A9=en_US&t=0.5982917545557167)

Note: The following documentation, guidance and recommendations, is provided with the product by the developer to the customer to assist end users with the secure configuration, installation, deployment, operation and maintenance of the ZTE OTN Solution v1.10:

Reference	Name	Version	Date
[UG CONF]	ZXONE 9700 ZXONE 7000 ZXMP M721 Common Criteria Security Evaluation - Certified Configuration	v3.0	2023-03-27
[UG CLI]	OTN Product CLI User Manual.en-US	V1.5,	2023-01-04
[UG QX]	OTN Product QX Interface Specification.en-US	V1.2,	2022-10-19
[UG-RTN]	ZXONE 9700 ZXONE 7000 ZXMP M721 Interface	V1.0	N/A

	Specification Return Value.en-US		
[UG NETCONF]	ZXONE 7000 NETCONF Interface Specification.en-US	V1.3,	2023-01-04
[UG 9700]	ZXONE 9700 Quick Installation Guide	R1.7,	2019-07-18
	Unitrans ZXONE 9700 Packet OTN Equipment Routine Maintenance(V4.20)	R1.1,	2022-02-28
	Unitrans ZXONE 9700 Packet OTN Equipment Alarm Handling(V4.20)	R1.0,	2021-06-15
	Unitrans ZXONE 9700 Packet OTN Equipment Performance Reference(V4.20)	R1.0,	2021-06-15
	Unitrans ZXONE 9700 Packet OTN Equipment Security Description(V4.20)	R1.0,	2021-06-25
	Unitrans ZXONE 9700 Packet OTN Equipment Hardware Description(V4.20)	R1.1,	2022-03-30
[UG 7000]	ZXONE 7000 Quick Installation Guide	R1.1,	2018-01-23
	Unitrans ZXONE 7000 Cloud OTN Equipment Routine Maintenance Guide(V2.00)	R1.0,	2019-07-03
	Unitrans ZXONE 7000 Cloud OTN Equipment Alarm Handling (V2.00)	R1.0,	2022-06-10
	Unitrans ZXONE 7000 Cloud OTN Equipment Performance Reference (V2.00)	R1.0,	2022-06-10
	Unitrans ZXONE 7000 Cloud OTN Equipment Security Description (V2.00)	R1.0,	2022-06-10
	Unitrans ZXONE 7000 Cloud OTN Equipment Hardware Description(V2.00)	R1.2,	2021-12-26
[UG M721]	ZXMP M721 Quick Installation Guide	R2.0,	2022-04-30
	Unitrans ZXMP M721 Metro-Edge OTN Equipment Routine Maintenance (V5.10)	R1.0,	2021-04-25
	Unitrans ZXMP M721 Metro-Edge OTN Equipment Alarm Handling (ZENIC ONE R22)(V5.10)	R1.0,	2021-06-30
	Unitrans ZXMP M721 Metro-Edge OTN Equipment Performance Reference (ZENIC ONE R22)(V5.10)	R1.0,	2021-06-30
	Unitrans ZXMP M721 Metro-Edge OTN Equipment Security Description(V5.10)	R1.0,	2021-06-10
	Unitrans ZXMP M721 Metro-Edge OTN Equipment Hardware Description(V5.10)	R1.4,	2022-08-27

3 Evaluation summary

3.1 Identification of used assurance components

The assurance components used in the product testing were:

- **EAL 3 augmented with ALC_FLR.2,**

as defined by, and detailed in, [CC] and [CEM].

3.2 EUCC State of the Art documents and Protection Profiles

Not applicable to this evaluation.

3.3 ICT Product testing

Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the developer's testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing responsibilities.

3.3.1 Testing approach and depth

The developer based the functional test plan on the security function requirements defined in the ST and developer documents. These tests cover the security related aspects of the TOE functions. In total 30 test cases are defined in test plan which covers the SSH, QX and NETCONF interfaces consisting of 30 test cases. These test cases were then divided into four categories based on the security relevant subsystems.

The developer has performed all the test on all the TOE hardware models with the corresponding software packages specified in chapter 2.1.

The evaluator created additional test cases test to confirm verification of the version of the TOE to further exercise the behaviour of critical functionality.

3.3.2 Independent penetration testing

To identify potential vulnerabilities the evaluator performed the following activities:

- SFR design analysis: SFR implementation details were examined in the SFR design analysis. During this examination potential vulnerabilities were identified.
- CWE vulnerability focus: Using the CWE weaknesses collection, the evaluator collected a list of security questions and related answers. This approach ensured that the evaluator was forced to think in terms of vulnerabilities from all different angles and improved completeness in the vulnerability analysis. Also during this examination several potential vulnerabilities were identified.
- Use of Scanning tools: The evaluator runs vulnerability scanning tools to identify potential vulnerabilities.
- Public vulnerability search: Several additional potential vulnerabilities were identified during a search in the public domain.

The total test effort expended by the evaluators was 40 hours. During that test campaign, 100% of the total time was spent on logical tests.

3.3.3 Test configuration

The evaluator has performed the tests on the following hardware models:

- ZXONE 9700 NXG1 running ZXONE 19700 V1.10.010.002B500 (with patches)
- ZXONE 7000 C2 running ZXONE 7000 V2.00R5B111 (with patches)
- ZXMP M721 DX63(E) running ZXMPM721 v5.10.070.001B100 (with patches)

The testing on these models was considered representative of all models.

3.3.4 Test results

The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.

The developer's tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.

No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.

The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e., from the current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.

3.4 ICT Product evaluation

3.4.1 Reused evaluation results

This was a new certification under EUCC.

3.4.2 Evaluated configuration

The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number ZTE OTN Solution v1.10.

3.4.3 Assessment against each assurance requirement

ASE

ASE	
ST introduction	ASE_INT.1
Conformance claims	ASE_CCL.1
Security problem definition	ASE_SPD.1
Security objectives	ASE_OBJ.2
Extended components definition	ASE_ECD.1
Security requirements	ASE.REQ.2
TOE summary specification	ASE.TSS.1

The findings are well-documented and internally consistent, demonstrating a thorough understanding of the Security Target [ST] and its components. The TOE introduction, conformance claim, security problems, security objectives, security requirements, TOE summary specification are appropriately addressed, and the TOE description is accurate and adequate for the evaluation level. Consequently, the ASE activities fulfil the assurance requirements EAL3 augmented with ALC_FLR.2. No issues or deviations were identified.

ADV

ADV	
Security architecture	ADV_ARC.1
Functional specification	ADV_FSP.3
TOE design	ADV_TDS.2

The evaluation has demonstrated that the developer's evidence meets ADV specified requirements. The TOE model is complete, clearly showing all interfaces (TSFI/non-TSFI), user roles, and relations, with explanations on completeness and tracing requirements met. The subsystem level model is sensible, useful, and shows TSFIs and subsystem decomposition. The behaviour of each subsystem and its interaction with other subsystems is explained. The security architecture is thoroughly explained, design compliance rationale is complete and coherent, and necessary evidence is extracted per alternative

approach. The evaluation presents for each SFR, how the TSFIs, subsystems provide this SFR, using the TOE, diagrams, screenshots, etc. The evaluation describes the roles of the TSFIs and subsystems in meeting these SFRs. Accordingly, the ADV activities meet the assurance requirements for EAL3 augmented with ALC_FLR.2, with no issues or deviations identified.

AGD

AGD	
Operational user guidance	AGD_OPE.1
Preparative procedures	AGD_PRE.1

The evaluation has demonstrated that the guidance documentation is clear, complete, and sufficient to support the secure acceptance, installation, configuration, and operation of the TOE within its intended environment by its user roles. The guidance effectively helps prevent common misconfigurations and promotes correct usage. Therefore, the AGD activities fulfil the assurance requirements for EAL3 augmented with ALC_FLR.2, with no issues or deviations identified.

ALC

ALC	
CM capabilities	ALC_CMC.3
CM Scope	ALC_CMS.3
Delivery	ALC_DEL.1
Development security	ALC_DVS.1
Life cycle definition	ALC_LCD.1
Flaw remediation	ALC_FLR.2

The evaluation has demonstrated that the developer's evidence meets ALC specified. The CI-list was comprehensive and uniquely identified all configuration items, with clear identification of the developer. The CM documentation effectively described unique identification methods, a CM plan for development, procedures for accepting modified or new CIs, and the CM system was operated in accordance with the CM plan to maintain all configuration items by automated means. The CM System allows authorized changes only. Delivery procedures were well-documented, ensuring security during TOE distribution. Flaw remediation procedures were comprehensive, including methods for receiving reports, tracking flaws, providing corrective actions, and updating users. Accordingly, the ALC activities satisfy the assurance requirements for EAL3 augmented with ALC_FLR.2, with no issues or deviations identified.

ATE

ATE	
Coverage	ATE_COV.2
Depth	ATE_DPT.1
Functional tests	ATE_FUN.1
Independent testing	ATE_IND.2

The evaluation has demonstrated that the developer's evidence for ATE requirements meets all specified requirements. The testing approach used by the developer effectively covered the TSFIs. The developer's rationale for testing all TSFIs was presented and verified. The developer test results show that for all tests the results were pass. For the evaluator's independent testing, the overall approach for test selection, goals for the witnessing session, and independent test plan were clearly outlined. The evaluator's testing

results showed that all sampled tests were passed. Accordingly, the ATE activities satisfy the assurance requirements for EAL3 augmented with ALC_FLR.2, with no issues or deviations identified.

AVA

AVA	
Vulnerability analysis	AVA_VAN.2

The penetration tests were defined and performed. The overall conclusion is that the TOE is protected against attackers possessing a basic attack potential, under the condition that the TOE user guidance is followed. Consequently, the AVA activities were performed in full compliance with the assurance requirements EAL3 augmented with ALC_FLR.2, providing a substantial level of confidence in the TOE's resistance to exploitation.

3.5 Results of the evaluation

The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE Intermediate Report, other evaluator documents and developer documentation [DEV_DOCS].

The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.


Based on the evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the ZTE OTN Solution v1.10, to be **CC:2022 R1 1 Part 2 conformant, CC:2022 R1 Part 3 conformant**, at an assurance level recognised by article 52 of [CSA] as “**Substantial**”, with **AVA_VAN 2** and to meet the requirements of **EAL 3 augmented with ALC_FLR.2**. This implies that the product satisfies the security requirements specified in Security Target [ST].

3.6 Certificate information and scheme label

A Certificate has been issued recognising this evaluation result as follows:

Unique identifier: EUCC-3110-2026-2500102-01

Date of issuance: 04-07-2026 and with a validity period of **5 years**.



3.7 Comments and Recommendations

The user guidance as outlined in section 2.6 contains necessary information about the usage of the TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE's security functionality, in particular the countermeasures against attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the software and the hardware part of the TOE. There are no particular obligations or recommendations for the user apart from following the user guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant details concerning the resistance against certain attacks.

In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.

The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.

4 Security Target

The certification references the following security target:

ZTE OTN Solution Security Target, Version 1.2, 2025-05-14 [ST].

5 Glossary

This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:

CM	Configuration Management
DCN	Data Communications Network
EMS	Equipment Management System
IP	Internet Protocol
IT	Information and communication technologies product as defined by [EUCC]
ITSEF	IT Security Evaluation Facility
MAC	Media Access Control
NMS	Network Management System
NNI	Network-to-network Interface
NTP	Network Time Protocol
OTE	Optical Transmission Equipment
OTN	Optical Transmission Network
SFR	Security Functional Requirement
SFTP	Secure File Transfer Protocol
SNMP	Simple Network Management Protocol
SSH	Secure Shell
TACACS+	Terminal Access Controller Access-Control System Plus
TCP	Transmission Control Protocol
TRNG	True Random Number Generator
TOE	Target of Evaluation; the object of the certification activity described by this report
VLAN	Virtual LAN

6 Bibliography

This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this report.

- [CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CC:2022 Parts 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, R1, November 2022
- [CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CEM:2022 R1, November 2022
- [CCMB-2024-002] Errata and Interpretation for CC:2022 (Release 1) and CEM:2022 (Release 1), Version 1.1
- [DEV_DOCS] ZXONE 9700 ZXONE 7000 ZXMP M721 Common Criteria Security Evaluation - Certified Configuration, Version 3.0, 2023-03-27
OTN Product CLI User Manual.en-US, Version 1.5, 2023-01-04
OTN Product QX Interface Specification.en-US, Version 1.2, 2022-10-19
ZXONE 9700 ZXONE 7000 ZXMP M721 Interface Specification Return Value.en-US, Version 1.0
ZXONE 7000 NETCONF Interface Specification.en-US, Version 1.3, 2023-01-04
The specific user guidance documents for ZXONE 9700 Series, ZXONE 7000 Series, and ZXMP M721 Series are listed in section 2.6 of this document, Supplementary Cybersecurity Information
ZTE CM Scope OTN, Version 3.0
- [ETR] Evaluation Technical Report "ZTE OTN Solution v1.10" – EAL3 augmented, 25-RPT-1630, Version 1.0, Dated 03 March 2026
- [EU-CSA] REGULATION (EU) 2019/881 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 17 April 2019 on ENISA (the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity) and on information and communications technology cybersecurity certification and repealing Regulation (EU) No 526/2013 (Cybersecurity Act)
- [EU-EUCC] COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2024/482 of 31 January 2024 laying down rules for the application of Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the adoption of the European Common Criteria-based cybersecurity certification scheme (EUCC)
- [EU-EUCC-amdt.1] Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/3144 of 18 December 2024 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/482 as regards applicable international standards and correcting that Implementing Regulation
- [EU-EUCC-amdt.2] Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2462 of 8 December 2025 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/482 as regards definitions, ICT product series certification, assurance continuity and state-of-the-art documents
- [ST] ZTE OTN Solution Security Target, Version 1.2, 2025-05-14

(This is the end of this report.)